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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****21 April 1960****PART I****OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST****CIVIL UNREST CONTINUES IN SOUTH KOREA**

Despite the suppression of large-scale violence by the imposition of martial law in Seoul and other major population centers, there may be further mass upheavals. The spontaneous violence that has ripped the capital and other major population centers stems from public outrage over the Rhee regime's increasing use of police-state tactics during the past year, culminating in the rigged presidential elections on 15 March. The regime now must decide whether to continue, and perhaps increase, harsh repressive measures or to make concessions which may endanger its existence.

At the height of the rioting in Seoul, an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 students and other persons battled police and attempted to break into the presidential palace. About 100 were killed and well over 500 wounded by police gunfire. Only after the arrival of troops was a semblance of order restored. In South Korea's second largest city, Pusan, some 15,000 demonstrators attacked police.

Following the brutal police suppression of opposition demonstrators, including a great many students, in the southern port city of Masan on election day, Rhee accepted the resignation of the unpopular home minister and made other token concessions to public indignation. As late as 19 April, however, Rhee gave American Ambassador McConaughy no indication of recognizing the basic issues

or of making any effective conciliatory moves.

On the contrary, he has been isolated from the true state of the crisis by his advisers and seemingly continues to believe that the mass rioting during the past month is the work of a small group of hoodlums and agitators manipulated by the Communists.

Rhee on 21 April accepted the resignation of his cabinet, thus attempting to place himself above the debacle by having his subordinates take the responsibility. Reportedly slated for key positions in the new cabinet are Yi Pom-sok, former strong man of the disbanded National Youth Corps; Pyon Yong-tae, a political nonentity who once served as prime minister and Ho Chong, a highly competent politician and former mayor of Seoul and adviser to Rhee who has been out of favor with the President for a number of years. The inclusion of Yi Pom-sok lends credibility to a reported Rhee statement of 20 April that he did not contemplate any easing of police-state methods, and that those who took part in the demonstrations would be treated as traitors to their country.

Leaders of Rhee's Liberal party have been divided between the advocates of a harsh policy and those who propose moderation. Many of the latter, however, have closely supported the government's repressive tactics and are now only maneuvering for increased power within the party.

SECRET

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

21 April 1960

The US Embassy in Seoul has previously noted that many observers believed the regime was "deliberately and inexorably" moving toward absolutism. One highly placed party member has stated that the backbone of the new party structure built for the elections was patterned on the Chinese Nationalist Kuomintang.

The resentment which led to the present violence probably will remain deep-seated throughout the nation until reforms are effected. Ambassador McConaughy has observed that nothing short of new, fairly conducted national elections, at least for the vice presidency, will cope with the mounting resentment. An American newsman in Seoul has speculated that Vice President - elect Yi Ki-pung might resign.

Motivated by frustration over their future and outraged by recent police torturing and shooting of their companions, college and high school students have been in the forefront of the demonstrations and violence. The government has announced that 56 persons seized by the police in Masan were tortured. After the proclamation of martial law on 19 April, Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Song Yo-chan admitted receiving reports of police "reprisals" against the demonstrators. He stated that although he ordered such activities stopped immediately, he did not know if his orders were carried out. He added that during the rioting, the police "lost their heads" and "were in a frenzy."

Since the populace presumably bears less animosity toward the military forces than toward the police--the people of one Seoul area reportedly look on

the troops as protectors--efforts of the troops to maintain order are less likely to provoke further violence.

In any event, the armed forces are strong enough to impose the will of the government.

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There is a possibility that in the absence of constructive action by Rhee and with continued unrest, the armed forces might intervene to establish a temporary government acceptable to the people and to provide eventually for free elections.

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During the disturbances there were no reports indicating anti-American sentiment, although the government seemingly had attempted to imply American support for its actions. The police announced on 17 April that the tear-gas bombs used to restore order in Masan were obtained through the US aid program. In a similar maneuver last year, the authorities based the closing of the outspoken pro-opposition Kyonghyang Sinmun, the country's second largest newspaper, on a US military government ordinance rather than on the then newly revised National Security Law. The administration had been strongly condemned for resorting to force to pass the revised law, which gave it virtually summary powers to suppress all criticism of the government.

Although the authorities--including President Rhee--have attempted to attribute the violence to Communist subversion, there has been no reliable

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

21 April 1960

evidence of Communist involvement. Some American observers, however, believe that the Communists may soon intervene unless the situation improves.

Since the Masan riots, Pyongyang has concentrated on reporting and publicizing South Korean disturbances. Reporting has been quite factual and tailor-made to substantiate North Korean statements that the Rhee regime is corrupt, venal, and hated by the popu-

lace. Other Communist powers, including the USSR, have picked up South Korean police announcements that American Army supplies, particularly tear gas, were used to quell the rioters in Seoul. A North Korean broadcast stated, "The weapons of the US imperialists are for suppressing the people." Pyongyang's commentary, although pledging sympathy and support for the demonstrators, has given no indication that the riots were Communist inspired or that North Korea intends to intervene.

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SOUTH AFRICA

An uneasy surface calm has been restored in South Africa. In two weeks of raids on urban native areas, police have virtually destroyed the overt organizations of African nationalist groups and have arrested several thousand opponents of the government. The urban African labor force, which chronically lives near the subsistence level, has temporarily exhausted its ability to wage economic warfare against the dominant European community. A work stoppage called by underground remnants of the African organizations for the week of 19 April failed completely.

Outbreaks nevertheless are likely to recur as security forces relax their vigilance and as Africans regain their ability for collective action.

The few African extremists still at large have reportedly allied with native gangster elements in an effort to increase their ability to intimidate the labor force. Native discontent may erupt in further violence throughout the country if Albert Luthuli, a widely respected moderate African nationalist, should die as a result of a stroke reportedly suffered following harsh police treatment.


The South African Government apparently plans to step up the economic and political development of the "Bantustans"--semi-autonomous native areas in rural parts of South Africa. The present national budget allocates about \$3,000,000 for Bantustan development during 1960, an increase from previous budgets but still far short of the \$30,000,000 annual expenditure

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

21 April 1960

recommended by a government-appointed commission in 1956. The Bantustans, overcrowded despite the fact that only about one third of the country's 10,000,-



000 Africans live in them, have little further economic potential.

At the same time, the government has indicated that it may relax some of the immediate sources of discontent among

urban Africans. Under proposed reforms, the native pass system would be less stringently applied, Africans would be permitted to buy hard liquor, and industry would be urged to pay higher wages. While these measures would reduce the restiveness of urban Africans to some extent, discontent is unlikely to be permanently stifled by such relatively minor concessions.

UN Secretary General Hammarskjold is preparing for a direct approach to the South African Government to follow up the Security Council's resolution of 1 April regarding the Union's policy of racial discrimination. Hammarskjold now plans to meet Foreign Minister Louw in London at the close of the Commonwealth prime ministers' meeting on 11 May to discuss arrangements for a visit to Cape Town in July or August. He believes this plan presents an opening for further negotiations and thus postpones the need for further UN Security Council action for the time being, unless further explosive incidents occur in South Africa.

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Moscow last week continued to criticize the Western powers for their alleged failure to undertake specific steps to assure the success of the summit conference. Commenting on the meeting of the Western foreign ministers in Washington, Soviet propaganda adopted the general line that the West has limited itself to words and has failed to realize that "originality of views" is the primary prerequisite for success at the summit.

Pravda again used Secretary Herter's 4 April speech

as the basis for detailed criticism of the Western position on disarmament and Germany, and Izvestia on 16 April took a similar approach by citing a Walter Lippmann article as indicative of the official Western intention to avoid definitive decisions at the heads-of-government meeting.

Timed to counter the Western ministers' communiqués and press reports that the West will propose a German plebiscite on whether a peace treaty should be signed with a united Germany

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

21 April 1960

or separate German states, both Pravda and Izvestia sharply rejected the plebiscite concept in either Berlin or Germany. Both papers also repeated the USSR's threat to sign a separate treaty if it fails to find understanding from the Western leaders on the Soviet proposal for a treaty with both Germanys. Izvestia added that "no one should entertain any illusions" that when such action is taken, "all rights arising from the defeat of Germany will lapse in all territory over which East Germany has sovereignty."

Berlin

Pravda on 14 April revived the proposal for an interim solution to Berlin's status. In response to Herter's statement tying Berlin to German unification, Pravda claimed that the possibility for agreement on Berlin--"even if provisional and partial"--became possible at the Geneva foreign ministers' conference, but only after the West had discarded its package proposals. Posing the question as to why the "positive experience" achieved at Geneva should be written off, Pravda asserted that these negotiations "came quite close" to framing individual provisions for an interim agreement.

Moscow's renewed emphasis on the interim agreement provided the signal for an East German initiative on 17 April in the form of a letter from Ulbricht to West German workers. Ulbricht indicated that as a measure to establish confidence, East Germany could agree to an interim solution which would include a restriction on "hostile" propaganda activity in West Berlin, a ban on stationing atomic weapons in the city, the gradual reduction of Western

troops, and the step-by-step abolition of the occupation status. The Ulbricht proposal corresponds closely to the terms for an interim agreement advanced by Gromyko at the Geneva meeting.

The East German letter makes no specific link between an interim solution and the establishment of an all-German commission, but in a speech on the same day, and in a television interview on 20 April, Ulbricht referred to the possibility of summit agreement to form such a commission based on parity of representation.

Although the bloc has concentrated over the past several months on the original Soviet proposals to convert West Berlin into a free city, the concept of an interim solution was never dropped completely. The memorandum delivered in mid-January by Soviet Ambassador Smirnov to the West German Social Democrats mentioned the development of a free city by stages, and the Moscow Declaration of the Warsaw Pact countries on 4 February criticized Western attempts to "cancel" the achievements of the Geneva negotiations. Again, in late March, Smirnov publicly assumed that the summit negotiations would begin at the point where the Geneva discussions ended.

East German politburo member Verner on 27 March asserted that an interim solution was possible "on the road to a demilitarized free city," adding that such a solution should include guarantees against the use of West Berlin as a center for propaganda against the "socialist states." As the summit approaches, this proposal will probably occupy a more prominent place in Soviet comments on the Berlin issue.

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

21 April 1960

25X1

delegation at the test ban talks provide further evidence that the USSR hopes to have major unresolved issues presented at the summit for decision. In an interview with an East German correspondent, Soviet delegate Tsarapkin hailed Western "acceptance in principle" of the Soviet moratorium proposal of 19 March as a turning point in the test ban talks, and he claimed that the conference was on the threshold of a period of intensive negotiations.

Tsarapkin also asserted that all the delegations had stated the negotiations should be speeded up, and he outlined "an extensive program of work" to be accomplished during the next few months. He listed in this program technical meetings for spelling out the details of the research program on detecting underground tests, "precise formulation" of the moratorium, determination of the composition of all control bodies, and the fixing of an on-site inspection quota. He pointed out that the American delegation's assurance that all candidates for the presidency have declared their agreement with the moratorium concept "allows us to hope" that a "sensible" time limit for it can be established.

Taking the same optimistic line on the chances for an early agreement, another member of the Soviet delegation said privately that the main outstanding issues must be settled at the summit level. He listed all the points set out by Tsarapkin, with the exception of the problem of spelling out the details of the research program, as falling within these main issues. He added that if they could be resolved by the heads of government, the conference could then quickly settle other

Test Ban Talks

Recent public and private remarks by members of the Soviet

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

21 April 1960

questions and prepare a treaty for signature by August. He reacted favorably, nevertheless, to a suggestion that these problems be discussed at private informal meetings of the three delegations.

The delegate declined to set forth Moscow's view on the number of annual inspections and contended that this question should be left to the heads of government. He stressed the expense that would be involved in each inspection, however, and said he doubted that Moscow would agree to as many as 20 inspections each year in the USSR. He indicated that the quota should apply to inspections for small tests covered by a moratorium as well as to the larger ones banned permanently by the treaty.

At the final meeting of the conference before the recess, Tsarapkin agreed to forming an ad hoc technical group for discussing the research and devel-

ment program. While stating that he was without instructions on whether to accept 11 May as the starting date for the group, he urged the Western delegations to proceed under the assumption that it would be acceptable to Moscow.

Disarmament Talks

The bloc delegations to the general disarmament talks appear to be marking time, awaiting the recess on 29 April. Soviet delegate Zorin has continued to urge the West to follow the Soviet lead and use the remaining time to find a platform for recommendations to the summit conference. He stressed that the principles proposed by the Soviet delegation, including the four-year time limit, were subject to negotiation. The bloc delegates also offered to consider any Western amendments, additions, or deletions, provided they were in the context of general principles.

25X1

CARIBBEAN HIGHLIGHTS

Fidel Castro is evidently worried over his inability to eliminate the guerrilla bands operating in the rugged Sierra Maestra of eastern Cuba. The government is trying to belittle the affair, but Castro himself spent more than a week in the area, reportedly personally leading operations--apparently without success. Although outlaw bands have long roamed the Sierra Maestra, continuation of the present activity could be important as a possible rallying point for anti-Castro elements. It is also likely to be a test of the support Castro retains among the peasants of the area--whom Castro claims to be the chief beneficiaries of his revolution. Guerrilla bands could not exist for long in the mountains with-

out the support of the peasants.

On returning from the area, Castro told newsmen he will have "important disclosures" for the Cuban people when he addresses them on May Day. He hinted that this might involve charges that the United States is supporting the guerrillas.

The Cuban leader, angered by recent decisions by the Supreme Court favoring owners of expropriated or government-operated private properties, probably plans drastic action to bring the court into line. He may be planning to name compliant President Dorticos to head the court. There are reports that Foreign Minister Roa, under

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

21 April 1960

25X1

fire from extremists in the government and discouraged by Latin American criticism of Cuban policies, may resign or be retired to the presidency. Armando Hart, present minister of education, is rumored to be slated to replace Roa in the Foreign Ministry. Hart would be susceptible to domination by pro-Communists influential in Cuban foreign affairs.

Castro seems intent on making the "mammoth" May Day rally in Havana a demonstration of strong support for his regime, not only by the Cuban masses but also by groups throughout the hemisphere. Evidently aware of the cool attitude of most Latin American governments, he is trying to show hemispheric support by inviting numerous political figures who, although out of office, retain reputations as liberal or "anti-imperialist" leaders.

They are to attend a "conference of democratic, political, and intellectual leaders" of Latin America which is to open on 30 April in Havana. Leftist and pro-Communist elements in a number of Latin American countries have been invited on expense-free visits to Cuba to attend this "conference" and an "Assembly of Solidarity with Cuba."

The Cuban Communist party is taking a leading part in preparations for the May Day rally and is using them in an effort to resolve in its favor the bitter internal rivalries with non-Communist factions in the powerful Cuban Labor Confederation.

In the Dominican Republic, the Trujillo regime continues to be in a precarious position. There are probably more political prisoners at this time than in January, when a high Dominican official admitted that 1,500 were being held. The church-state conflict is deepening, and reports of police atrocities and the sadistic acts by members of the Trujillo family are being confirmed almost daily by defectors and friends of those abused.

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
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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****21 April 1960****MILITARY UPRISING IN VENEZUELA**

The Venezuelan armed forces seem to be on the point of crushing an uprising by dissident Venezuelan military leaders who on 20 April gained control of the garrison in San Cristobal, a provincial capital in southwestern Venezuela bordering on Colombia. This move climaxed a period of unrest in Caracas occasioned primarily by numerous reports of military plotting and intensi-

fied by unfavorable economic conditions and strains in President Betancourt's three-party coalition. Key military, labor, and political groups have rallied to Betancourt's support, and his control apparently is not threatened for the present, but a further period of tension and political maneuvering is likely.

The principal leader of the rebels is General Castro Leon, a

**SECRET**

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

21 April 1960

key figure in the ouster of former Dictator Perez Jimenez and minister of defense for a brief period under the succeeding junta regime. Other dissident elements who may be cooperating with Castro's group include the followers of Perez and the associates of officers arrested last January for plotting against the government. None of these groups has any sizable civilian backing, but all of them have the assistance of Dominican dictator Trujillo.

The armed forces have reportedly moved energetically to quell the uprising, which thus far has not touched off any serious defections in garrisons outside the area where the fighting is localized. On the other hand, the government is aware of the questionable loyalty of some segments of the officer class and of the need for prompt action to suppress the revolt before it spreads. Aware of the strong leftist support in Venezuela for Prime Minister Fidel Castro, Cuban President Dorticos has formally offered arms and men to Betancourt to put down the plot engineered by "reactionary" interests, and supported by "big foreign firms."

The present unrest was possibly timed to take advantage of unfavorable economic conditions, including a decline in foreign exchange holdings, high unemployment, tight credit, an increasing rate of business failures, and a general lowering

of business confidence. Politically, there has been dissension within the three-party coalition, and radical elements in Betancourt's own Democratic



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Action party (AD) are moving to set up a new political group. However, the present party strife has been shelved temporarily to present a united civilian front to meet the threat of a military takeover.

Leftist elements and Communists are likely to take advantage of the uprising--which may reflect adversely against the prestige of the entire military establishment--to renew their attacks on the armed forces and to increase their pressures on Betancourt for more radical domestic policies. It is too early to assess his probable reaction to these pressures, but he will probably be responsive to demands for some form of direct retaliation against Trujillo.

25X1

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SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

21 April 1960

PART II**NOTES AND COMMENTS****MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS****Iraq**

The week-long visit of Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan to Iraq failed to provide the Iraqi Communists with the boost they had been hoping for. Likewise, it did not raise the sagging prestige of the USSR in Iraq. Qasim's attitude toward the visit as a whole, and especially in the financial talks with Mikoyan, apparently reflected the growing influence of anti-Communist elements--particularly those in the army and such moderate cabinet members as Foreign Minister Jawad and Finance Minister Hadid.

Pressure against local Communists is continuing. Iraqi railways workers have been officially warned against carrying on political activities or inciting strikes.

The socialistic National Democratic party is torn with dissension, and its differences will be brought into the open during the party's congress in late April. The party's traditional leader, Kamil Chadirchi, who has long been sympathetic toward the Communists, is working toward cooperation with them. At the same time, he is arguing that the National Democrats should withdraw from all participation in the Qasim regime. Husayn Jamil, former ambassador to Iran and party secretary general, has resigned his post as a member of the founding committee. Jamil and Chadirchi are ranged against Finance Minister Hadid, who insists that the party continue its participation in the Qasim government.

UAR-Lebanon-Israel

The picketing by American stevedores of the UAR freighter

Cleopatra in New York, protesting the UAR's boycott of ships which trade in Israel, has led to counteraction by UAR longshoremen against American ships in UAR ports. Dockworkers' unions in Alexandria, Port Said, and Latakia have declared their intention of boycotting American vessels if picketing of the Cleopatra continues. According to press reports from Damascus, five American ships, including two tankers, are already being boycotted in Syrian ports. Longshoremen in Lebanon and Aden are said to be ready to take similar action.

The UAR is urging dockworkers throughout the Arab world to join in the boycott; the executive council of the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions held an emergency meeting in Cairo on 20 April to discuss the situation. An affiliated body, the United Arab Petroleum and Petrochemical Workers Union, reportedly announced on 18 April that it had given the New York maritime unions one week to end their boycott of UAR vessels.

Cairo news media are in full cry about what they assert is a Zionist-sponsored demonstration against the Cleopatra--"a last desperate effort by Zionists to break the UAR economic blockade of Israel and force passage of the Suez Canal." The UAR Government is awaiting the outcome of injunction proceedings in a New York federal court against the picketing. Swedish and Finnish maritime unions have already declared sympathy with the American unions, and Danish unions may do likewise.

SECRET

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

21 April 1960

Sudan

The Abboud military regime, whose first year of rule was marked by three major coup attempts and a couple of abortive minor plots, has enjoyed several months of comparative tranquillity. Now, however, there are signs that new attempts to change or overthrow the government may be impending. No group outside the government appears at this time to have the strength to succeed in a coup.

this action is endorsed by all army leaders. The Mahdi has warned the government that such measures against him would force "drastic countermeasures"; in an emergency he could probably muster several thousand partially armed Ansar tribesmen.

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In the event of a full-scale showdown, it seems doubtful that the regime can count on support from all five regional army commanders. The commander of the Southern Region has made no secret of his ambition to lead a new military junta, while the commanders of the Western and Central Regions are reported to be opportunists who will aim to ally themselves with the winning side. The regime has reportedly decided to extend the length of tour of troop units in the south in order to postpone the usual annual rotation of troops through Khartoum and prevent any increase in the effective strength of area commands adjacent to the capital.

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Sidiq al-Mahdi, head of the influential Ansar religious sect, and Ismail al-Azhari, prominent leader of the National Unionist party, are cooperating in sustaining pressures for a rapid return to civilian government, and the Supreme Council members have been unable to agree on how to deal with them. The minister of interior has refused to present them with an ultimatum to desist or be jailed unless

MIKOYAN IN IRAQ

Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan's eight-day visit to Iraq, ostensibly to open the Soviet trade exhibition, appears to have been primarily an attempt to assess Qasim's intentions and the internal political situation in Iraq. Moscow is apparently disturbed

by recent signs of an improvement in Iraq's relations with the West and by Qasim's hardened attitude toward Iraqi Communists.

The Iraqi Government's reception of Mikoyan was correct but not particularly enthusiastic.

SECRET

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

21 April 1960

Although the two leaders talked privately for many hours, no communiqué was issued. On leaving, Mikoyan stated that there had been no negotiations, but that their conversations had been interesting and useful to both countries.

The visit did not inhibit the Qasim regime from continuing its strong measures to undermine the Iraqi Communists. The Baghdad military court began trials of a large additional group of Communists, and the army used force to break up several small strikes which apparently were Communist inspired.

Nationalist newspapers used the visit to make new attacks on Iraqi Communists; one paper asked Mikoyan, "Have you, O Comrade, come to communize?" When Mikoyan went to Basra on 14 April, the army and police sealed off all avenues approaching his route into the city and beat off crowds of Communist demonstrators who attempted to break through. Soviet displeasure at these tactics--and perhaps at the entire tone of Mikoyan's reception in Iraq--was reflected in complaints in Pravda and Izvestia the following day that Mikoyan was prevented from contact with "the Iraqi people." Although Moscow's criticism was confined to "Basra authorities," the papers said that the violent police tactics used to disperse the "welcoming crowd" had left a "bitter aftertaste."

Mikoyan's public statements were largely cordial generalities. He said the USSR subscribes to and supports the "basic principles" of Iraqi foreign policy, and he boasted of Soviet economic progress, probably in an effort to counter the current wave of Iraqi disenchantment with the as yet

slim returns of Moscow's aid program.

His exchange with newsmen on 16 April, however, struck a somewhat contentious note. Some of the questions appear to have been deliberately provocative. Mikoyan objected sharply to an allegation that the USSR "supports Israel" on the issue of the Palestinian Arabs and recited at length the record of Soviet support for the Arabs on a number of other postwar issues. He claimed that these allegations were a distortion of Soviet policy which no educated Arab could make, and said he doubted that the question was "raised in the interests of the Arabs." To the correspondent's reply that he was dissatisfied with Mikoyan's answer, the Soviet deputy minister retorted that he could not please everyone.

In answer to a query concerning the USSR's failure to recognize the Algerian Provisional Government, Mikoyan said the Soviet Government gave greater support to the Algerians than some countries which have extended recognition. He added that it was necessary to consider whether official recognition by Moscow in the existing circumstances would be of advantage to the Algerians. Qasim apparently asked for no additional aid. It is rumored in Baghdad that as a result of Mikoyan's refusal to agree to Iraqi requests to renegotiate the terms of the existing agreement, Qasim has ordered suspension of further commitments under the loan until the matter is resolved. In response to a direct question at his final news conference, Mikoyan announced that no alteration of the \$137,500,000 aid program was envisaged. Agreements with Iraq are "so good," he said, "that neither side wishes to change them."

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

21 April 1960

KHRUSHCHEV AND MENDERES TO EXCHANGE VISITS

The announcement on 12 April that Premiers Khrushchev and Menderes will exchange visits marks the successful conclusion of persistent Soviet efforts in Ankara since early 1960 to arrange the exchange. Moscow will probably make a serious bid, using this development, to induce Turkey's nearby allies, especially Greece and Iran, to follow Turkey's example and moderate their anti-Soviet policies.

Ankara's agreement was apparently intended to put Turkey in a favorable position to take advantage of any post-summit improvement in East-West relations. Turkish officials emphasize, however, that the decision does not represent any change in Ankara's firmly anti-Communist foreign policy.

According to Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu, the Soviet ambassador already has complained that the atmosphere in Turkey is "not very warm" for Khrushchev's reception. Zorlu has informed American officials that Ankara has no intention of trying to change this situation.

The Greek Government is "resentful and unhappy" over Ankara's action and the Turkish announcement's failure to state that Menderes will visit Athens before going to the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Averoff informed Ambassador Briggs that news of the Khrushchev-Menderes exchange of visits has caused the Karamanlis government more domestic difficulties than it had anticipated, and that Athens must soon de-

cide whether to "fall in line" and abandon its resistance to a detente with the Soviet bloc.

The opposition press in Greece, including the anti-Communist center as well as the far left, has again attacked the government for its "inflexible" foreign policy. Several non-Communist political leaders have denounced the Karamanlis administration for permitting Greece to become isolated in its opposition to Soviet economic and cultural initiatives.

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The semiannual meeting of CENTO's ministerial council will be held in Tehran from 28 to 30 April, and will be concerned principally with CENTO's lack of a military command structure and with the slow progress being made on telecommunications and the Turkish-Iranian rail connection.

25X1

Pakistani officials are beginning to wonder whether their inflexible anti-Communist posture is out of date in the East-West thaw, but they will undertake no review of their line toward the USSR until after the Commonwealth conference in London in May.

Some Iranian officials, including Prime Minister Eqlal, have shown concern over the Khrushchev-Menderes visits,

SECRET

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

21 April 1960

while others, apparently including the Shah, tend to view the meetings as proof that a hard line will eventually convince Soviet leaders that pressure tactics are counterproductive. Soviet-Iranian relations continue at a standstill.

Soviet leaders are probably confident that the cumulative effects of the bloc's subversion and propaganda campaigns and the impact of Khrushchev's contacts with Western heads of government will bring about new Iranian efforts to improve relations.

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TURKISH POLITICAL SITUATION

Political tension in Turkey, which has been developing since early this year when rumors began circulating that the government was preparing for early elections, came to a head during the past week. On 18 April the governing Democratic party (DP), with 409 members in the 610-seat Grand National Assembly, introduced and passed legislation setting up a commission--with an all-DP membership--to investigate the "illegal and subversive" acts of the major opposition party and the press. The new commission immediately suspended political activity for three months and banned all publicity regarding the activities of the commission.

Ismet Inonu, leader of the Republican People's party (RPP), at which the legislation is aimed, protested bitterly in a speech before the assembly that the legislation was "illegal, undemocratic, and unacceptable." Later in the day a scuffle occurred near RPP headquarters in Ankara when police attempted to disperse a crowd which was cheering Inonu on his arrival.

Premier Menderes, after receiving reports from various parts of Turkey, apparently has decided against early elections. National elections probably will

not take place before next year and may be postponed until 1962. An incident early this month near the city of Kayseri may have influenced Menderes' decision. Inonu proposed to address a meeting of RPP leaders in that city, but the government moved to forbid the meeting and used troops to force him to change his itinerary during his visit to the Kayseri area. The opposition and independent press denounced these actions, and reports indicate that both Inonu and the RPP gained new support.

At this point the DP leadership apparently decided to move against the RPP through the legislature. The DP's parliamentary group issued a memorandum comparing the RPP to the Communists and denouncing the party's "destructive, illegitimate, and illegal activities." The RPP replied with a motion--ignored by the DP-controlled assembly--to investigate Menderes and his alleged totalitarian violations of the constitution and his attempts to destroy all opposition.

The ban on political activity may allow a "cooling-off" period and thus reduce some of the tension in the country. Conversely, further attempts to

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

21 April 1960

"liquidate" the RPP--as predicted by one cabinet minister--could lead to rioting and possibly more serious uprisings. The position of the army is particularly important if Menderes actually contemplates eliminating his opposition. Inonu--a former military leader and com-

rade-in-arms of Ataturk--is believed to have considerable support within this service, and it may be significant that the Kayseri incidents were followed by the resignations--and later arrests--of four army officers.

25X1

TOGO ACHIEVES INDEPENDENCE

On 27 April the French-administered UN trust territory of Togo becomes the fifth independent country in West Africa. Although politically stable at present, the new state under Prime Minister Sylvanus Olympio faces a struggle for economic viability and a noisy campaign by the neighboring Nkrumah regime to bring about "integration" with Ghana.

Olympio--a 57-year-old British-educated former businessman who led the Togolese nationalists' long struggle for independence--is the country's undisputed political leader. His well-organized Togolese Unity Committee, in power since its sweeping victory in a UN-supervised election on 27 April 1958, now controls 33 of the 46 seats in Togo's legislature.

Togo's most pressing economic problem is its dependence on a few agricultural exports--principally cocoa and coffee--which are subject to wide price fluctuations on the world market. Exploitation of high-grade phosphate deposits, scheduled to begin this year, should help to diversify the economy. Nevertheless, Togo will still have to rely on external sources for the developmental capital and technical assistance required to meet the rising expectations of the people. The new state's potential is also limited by

its small size--23,000 square miles--and population--about 1,100,000 African tribesmen.

Although Togo can be expected generally to favor the West, it will be essentially African oriented and may tend at times toward a neutralist position. In African councils, Togo probably will be aligned with Liberia. Olympio's outlook on such questions as Afri-



OLYMPIO

can solidarity is much closer to that of Liberia's President Tubman, who favors a loose association of African states, than to that of Nkrumah or Guinea's Sekou Touré, the militant advocates of "union now." With the full support of every group of any importance in Togo, Olympio will continue to resist Nkrumah's efforts to integrate Togo with Ghana.

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**


21 April 1960

For political reasons, Olympio has refused to conclude any special bilateral arrangements with France prior to Togo's independence, but agreements for cooperation in a number of fields probably will be signed shortly thereafter. Meanwhile, French influence will be preserved through the retention of French technicians and administrators in many key government positions. Togo is also expected to remain within the franc monetary zone and to continue to receive preferential treatment for its exports in the French market.

In time, however, the country's economic requirements, the naiveté of its leaders about Communist penetration tactics,

and the leftist tendencies of many younger elements may make the Togolese Government susceptible to blandishments from the Sino-Soviet bloc--especially if aid from the West and the UN falls significantly short of expectations. Developing bloc interest in Togo is indicated by its inclusion in the itinerary of a high-level East German labor delegation which recently visited West Africa, as well as by the reported transfer to Lome last month of the former deputy chief of the East German trade mission in Conakry.

The USSR and probably other bloc countries will be formally^{25X1} represented at Togo's independence celebrations, to which all UN members were invited.

**CAMEROUN**

Pro-Western Prime Minister Ahidjo's position appears to have been strengthened as a result of the general election held in Cameroun on 10 April. However, the failure of six of his cabinet members from southern constituencies to win re-election again dramatized

Ahidjo's lack of popularity in the south.

Ahidjo's Camerounian Union, which derives its principal support from the conservative Moslem chiefs who dominate the northern part of the country, had no opposition for the

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

21 April 1960

44 seats allocated to that area. In addition, government supporters won at least 16 southern seats for a healthy majority of the 100 seats in Cameroun's new National Assembly. Many of the southern gains, however, appear to have been plurality victories achieved as a result of a splitting of the anti-Ahidjo vote among competing opposition candidates. In the constitutional referendum held last February, the south cast a majority against the government's draft, which was nevertheless adopted on the strength of an overwhelmingly favorable vote in the north.

Southern opposition to Ahidjo is a reflection of the deep and many-faceted cleavage between the two sections of the country. The south is inhabited mainly by Christian and pagan tribesmen who are more volatile and more politically conscious than are the Moslems of the less-developed north. Elements dominant in the south spearheaded Cameroun's drive for independence from France and have vigorously condemned the Ahidjo regime's continued reliance on French support.

The less extreme wing of the Union of the Cameroun Populations (UPC) was the chief beneficiary in the election from this southern discontent. The

UPC, a Marxist-oriented nationalist movement, was restored to legality in February after having been proscribed for nearly five years. Complete returns indicate that some 22 members or close supporters of this group, including its most prominent leader, Theodore Mayi-Matip, were elected. By contrast, Felix Moumie's Conakry-based extremist UPC faction, which is heavily involved in the terrorism and tribal dissidence still plaguing parts of the southwest, boycotted the election and will not be represented at all in the new assembly. Moumie's efforts to induce a massive abstention were unsuccessful.

Ahidjo, who seems likely to move up to the powerful new office of president when the assembly fills this position next month, now may move to bring the UPC and perhaps other representative southern elements into the new government. Such a coalition, which would probably hinge in part on Ahidjo's willingness to accelerate efforts to end Cameroun's present dependence on France, would seem to offer the best hope of increasing national unity. Any new government, however, will continue to face the problem of dealing with the UPC extremists and the rebellious Bamileke tribesmen in the southwest.

25X1

PRESSURE FOR INDEPENDENCE IN TANGANYIKA

African spokesmen in the British trust territory of Tanganyika are stepping up demands for full independence instead of the internal self-rule promised them for this fall. Julius Nyerere, the Edinburgh-educated leader of the dominant Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), has acknowledged that he is under considerable pressure from his followers and that he wants full independence

no later than January 1962. Despite their respect for Nyerere, British officials are concerned over signs of radicalism within TANU; they also fear the effect Tanganyikan independence would have on nationalist movements in neighboring Kenya and Uganda.

London's agreement last December to grant internal self-rule placed Tanganyika in the

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

21 April 1960

lead among East African areas on the way to independence. The evolution to self-rule was facilitated by the absence of an entrenched settler minority in Tanganyika and by the presence



NYERERE

of a cohesive nationalist organization, TANU. While Nyerere was visiting the United States in March, however, secondary spokesmen in TANU became insistent in their demands for total independence, and Nyerere on his return faced an incipient revolt.

Nyerere has made use of the pressure on him from his own party in dealing with the British and with the UN visiting mission now in the trust territory. He endorsed a TANU memo-

randum to the mission calling for "immediate independence" following the legislative elections to be held in August but indicated to a member of the mission that it had been drafted prior to his return to Tanganyika. Developments during Nyerere's absence increased British apprehensions concerning the irresponsibility of his lieutenants. Governor Turnbull likened Nyerere to a sober man "standing at a bar among a group of drunken friends, gradually getting drunk on the fumes."

Despite notable progress toward independence in the past year, Tanganyika appears to be entering a crucial period. It remains far below its neighbors in economic development; British officials have estimated that it will not be economically stable for two or three years. TANU remains preoccupied with political objectives, however, and London may eventually set an independence date compatible with Nyerere's goal of January 1962.

In Kenya, where Africans have been granted increased participation in government but no firm date for self-government, nationalists continue to hope that Tanganyika will set the pattern for British East Africa.

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FRENCH ARMY COMMAND CHANGES IN ALGERIA


A sweeping shake-up in the French command structure in Algeria has resulted in the replacement of three of the four top generals and extensive shifting of lower ranking officers. Most of the generals newly assigned to the Algerian corps and zone commands have been brought from staff or re-

gional commands in France, apparently a move to place men of broader perspective and more certain loyalty into important command posts. By removing many of the officers who have led military operations, however, De Gaulle is risking lower morale and possible outright discontent.

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

21 April 1960



The new commander in chief of French armed forces in Algeria is Army Lt. Gen. Jean Crepin, who first received prominent mention when he was called from a job on the staff of former Algerian Commander in Chief Challe to replace Maj. Gen. Jacques Massu as commander of the Algiers Army Corps.



CREPIN

Crepin managed to stay clear of involvement in the January insurrection in Algiers and is probably considered by Paris to be a loyal and willing instrument of its policy. The two new commanders of the Algiers and Constantine Army Corps, Lieutenant Generals Vezinet and Gouraud, have most recently served as commanders of military regions in metropolitan France.

Three other shifts involve commanders of top paratroop units which had been key elements of Challe's general reserve but which had demurred at moving against the Algiers insurgents in January. Lt. Gen. Jean Gilles, chief of inter-arms operations and commanding general of French airborne troops in North Africa, has been shifted to a French regional command. Brigadier Generals Ducourneau and Gracieux, commanders of the 25th and 10th

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

21 April 1960

Parachute Divisions respectively, were given new posts. Brigadier General St. Hillier, an aide to Minister of Armed Forces Messmer, has been assigned to command the 10th Division.

The command shake-up--combined with disciplinary and, in at least two cases, legal measures against French officers in Algeria--will bring to key posts a group of officers likely to be more responsive to governmental directives. Additional

widespread command changes among lower ranking officers, normally unpublicized, are apparently in prospect. These are presumably aimed at those officers whose criticism of government policy has made them a primary source of possible army disloyalty. These sweeping changes may lower morale, however, and could result in a lessened fighting capability and outright discontent that would backfire on Paris, especially in view of reported rebel military build-ups.

25X1

USSR REPORTS FAVORABLE FIRST-QUARTER PLAN RESULTS

A TASS summary of the report of the USSR's economic performance during the first quarter of this year indicates continued progress toward the industrial goals of the Seven-Year Plan. The gross value of industrial production was reported up 11 percent over the first quarter of last year. An 11-percent increase was reported for the first quarter of 1959

steel, iron ore, oil, gas, and electricity. Raw-material shortages responsible for the abandonment of the Sixth Five-Year Plan in 1957 seem to have been overcome, and rates of growth in general exceed those needed to achieve Seven-Year-Plan goals.

The increase in industrial output reflects a rise of about 3.7 percent in the industrial labor force and a reported 7-percent growth in man-year labor productivity. This growth compares with a claimed average annual increase of 6.7 percent for the last three years. Output per man-hour rose even more because of the continued progress in the reduction-in-hours program, which covered 13,000,000 workers by the end of 1959 and

SOVIET PRODUCTION OF SELECTED COMMODITIES

	FIRST QUARTER 1960	FIRST QUARTER 1959	PERCENTAGE INCREASE	ANNUAL PERCENTAGE INCREASE NEEDED TO ACHIEVE SEVEN-YEAR PLAN GOALS
PIG IRON (MILLION METRIC TONS)	11.4	10.5	8.6	7.4-8.5
CRUDE STEEL	16.1	14.5	11.0	6.6-7.4
ROLLED STEEL	12.7	11.4	11.1	6.2-7.2
IRON ORE	25.2	22.6	11.5	7.8-8.8
PETROLEUM	34.5	29.8	15.8	10.6-11.3
COAL	129.0	126.0	2.4	2.8-3.0
GAS (BILLION CUBIC METERS)	11.9	9.2	29.3	25.3
ELECTRIC POWER (BILLION KWH)	65.9	56.8	16.0	11.7-12.1

21 APRIL 1960

over the first quarter of 1958 and for the entire year 1959 over 1958. The Seven-Year Plan (1959-65) called for an average annual increase of 8.6 percent in gross value of industrial production.

Significant increases were reported in the production of major industrial commodities--

which this year is to be extended to another 6,000,000 in state industry.

Production-output rates claimed for the first quarter of 1960 for machine tools, self-propelled combines, and tractors are satisfactory in terms of Seven-

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

21 April 1960

Year-Plan goals. Production of chemical equipment reportedly increased 62 percent over the first quarter of last year, a measure of the USSR's continuing efforts to increase this output sharply.

Light industry continues to make good progress. Comparing corresponding first quarters for cotton, woolen, and linen fabrics and leather shoes, the rate of increase in 1960 over 1959 was greater than that achieved in 1959 over 1958.

However, in the production of "silk fabrics," which include rayon and other synthetics, the first quarter of 1960 showed a decrease from the corresponding period in 1959, suggesting that the production of these fibers is not going as planned, or that a greater portion of the output is going to the knitting industry rather than into cloth.

(Prepared by ORR)

25X1

IMPENDING HIGH-LEVEL PERSONNEL CHANGES RUMORED IN MOSCOW

Rumors in Moscow allege that shifts of top-level party and government personnel will take place in the near future. According to one story, party presidium candidates Dmitry Polyansky and Aleksey Kosygin will be promoted to full membership at a forthcoming central committee meeting. They will replace Nikolay Belyayev and Aleksey Kirichenko, who apparently have not been formally removed from the presidium.

Polyansky heads the government of the Russian Republic (RSFSR); Kosygin is a USSR deputy premier and chief of the State Planning Committee. Their promotion to full membership on the 14-man presidium would increase to five the number of full-time government officials on the top Soviet policy-making body. The presidium now is composed of 10 full-time party functionaries and three government officials, in addition to



SHELEPIN



POLYANSKY



KOSYGIN

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

21 April 1960

Khrushchev, who functions both as party first secretary and as USSR premier.

Removal of Kirichenko and Belyayev would logically follow their dismissals from party administrative posts last January. Kirichenko, long Khrushchev's second in command in the professional party machine, evidently lost the confidence of his mentor during the latter half of 1959 and may have become involved in policy disputes with Khrushchev. Another possibility is that Kirichenko engaged in factional infighting with other Khrushchev lieutenants, using his position as second-ranking party secretary to promote members of his personal following to favored posts both in Moscow and the republics.

Belyayev was removed as Kazakh party chief following his failure to remedy the republic's pressing economic problems. At the party central committee meeting last December, he was severely criticized by Khrushchev for poor leadership in organizing the Kazakh harvest and for lacking the courage to admit his errors. A further factor in his removal may have been the outbreak of rioting at the Karaganda Metallurgical Combine last October.

Other rumors and reports assert that Aleksandr Shelepin, who has been chief of the state security committee (KGB) since December 1958, is "in trouble" and may have been removed from office. While these allegations

are unconfirmed, they may reflect the Kremlin's apparent concern over the secret police. During the past year, Shelepin has carried out a major reorganization of the KGB, apparently intended to increase the overall efficiency of the state security establishment. Two new deputy chairmen were appointed, and republic KGB heads were replaced in seven of the Soviet republics.

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There are as yet no indications of high-level dissatisfaction with Shelepin's administration of the KGB. If he has fallen into disfavor, his formal removal would probably take place at the next session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, scheduled to open on 5 May. Promotions of Polyansky and Kosygin, on the other hand, would likely be formalized at a plenum of the central committee. Such a meeting would presumably precede the Supreme Soviet session and serve mainly as a demonstration of party support for Khrushchev on the eve of the summit meeting in Paris.

25X1

MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY

During the past four years, the Soviet Communist party has grown at an unusually rapid rate of more than 20 percent and now totals nearly 8,750,000 members and candidate members. This expansion reflects the policy

enunciated by Khrushchev in February 1954 and endorsed at the 20th party congress in February 1956 reversing the restrictive recruitment practices adopted by Stalin after the war. From 1947 to 1952,

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

21 April 1960

party ranks increased only 8 percent; from 1952 to 1956, only 4.8 percent.

At the same time, the party leadership has been systematically pruning the ranks. There were some 1,520,000 candidates admitted to full

nearly two thirds of the annual admissions into the party since 1956 have been workers and peasants. Since no overall figures on the proportion of these elements in the party have been released, it may be assumed that white-collar personnel still predominate, although at a somewhat reduced level. In any case, recent data on admissions of industrial and agricultural specialists into the party coincide closely with the so-called worker-peasant admissions, suggesting that those classified officially as rank-and-file "proletarians" probably include a large number of factory and farm supervisors.

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Year	Members	Candidates Admitted to Full Membership	Candidates	Total
1952	8,795,898	283,000	419,609	7,215,505
1957		353,000		
1958		396,000		
1959	7,622,356	488,000	616,775	8,239,131
1960	8,017,000		691,000	8,708,000

membership status between 1956 and 1960, but the net increase was only 1,221,104 full members. Hence nearly 300,000 persons, including 93,356 in 1959 alone, were either dropped from membership in the party because of death, illness, or incompetence or were demoted to candidate status. These figures are not excessive, however, considering past practices and the increased size of the party. They indicate that the party leadership is confident of its ability to assimilate new members.

According to an article in a recent issue of Party Life,

About one of every 16 Soviet citizens over the age of 19 is a party member, whereas the ratio in 1939 was one to 43. The membership, now consisting largely of those who entered the ranks after the war, includes over a million persons with no more than three years' tenure. The rapid growth of the party in recent years explains in part the regime's renewed emphasis on ideological indoctrination and on the rapid promotion of able young party members to positions of authority.

25X1

BRITAIN REAPPRAISING POSITION ON EUROPEAN TRADE DISPUTE

Britain apparently is reappraising its relations with the European Economic Community (EEC or Common Market). In marked contrast to its attitude only three weeks ago when Prime Minister Macmillan warned of the political consequences which could follow an economic split in Europe, the British Government now is playing down the

significance of the EEC's proposal to begin imposing its common tariff on external goods on 1 July--18 months earlier than originally planned. The American Embassy believes the government may be considering some form of unilateral tariff reduction which, while presented as a move unrelated to any EEC action, would imply London's willingness to

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

21 April 1960

reach an accommodation with the Common Market countries.

Public support for such a gesture has been growing. Within the past week, the influential Federation of British Industries has urged the government to "face facts" and to seek an early adjustment with the EEC. Officials in both the federation and the Association of British Chambers of Commerce have told the embassy that business is already adjusting to the Common Market and that it feels the government should take the same approach rather than fight it.

Still more significant is the reported conclusion of the Economic Committee of the 8,000,000-member Trades Union Congress (TUC) that the economic security of British workers would not be imperiled if Britain were to become a full member of the Common Market. The TUC had previously

been highly suspicious of EEC participation as a threat to British welfare benefits.

No precipitate action is likely. Any hasty move probably would generate even more suspicion among the Common Market countries about British intentions. London would be reluctant to scuttle completely the European Free Trade Association, which it fathered as a multilateral effort to deal with the EEC. Commonwealth members have been repeatedly assured that Britain will continue to give top priority to the Commonwealth preference system. The Commonwealth prime ministers' conference in London beginning on 3 May will give Prime Minister Macmillan an early opportunity to sound out initial reactions to any proposed changes.

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CAMBODIA

The dispute in Cambodia's ruling circles over choice of a successor to King Suramarit, who died on 3 April, apparently amounts to a test of strength between Prince Sihanouk and other members of the royal family. The formation of a new government by elder statesman Pho Proeung on 18 April, following Sihanouk's refusal to resume the premiership after his resignation a week earlier, is probably a stopgap measure.

The new premier is weak and colorless, and government operations will be hampered by the necessity of clearing all decisions with Sihanouk, who remains the principal locus of political power. Sihanouk may be waiting for "spontaneous" mass demonstrations demanding his return to power; on the other hand, he apparently is genuinely weary of office, having

held the premiership since July 1958. In a public explanation of his actions, Sihanouk hit at palace intrigue and corruption, and expressed a preference to serve the nation "outside the government so that the harmony between the throne



PHO PROEUNG

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****21 April 1960**

and the state may be enhanced."

The three-man regency council which is acting during the interregnum is chaired by Prince Monireth, Sihanouk's uncle and frequent critic. Despite denials by Sihanouk, rumors persist of serious differences between him and Monireth. The position taken in this dispute by the widowed Queen Kossamak--Sihanouk's mother and Monireth's sister--is unknown, but she may well have aspirations to succeed to the throne herself. This would require modifying the constitution. Sihanouk, who abdicated in 1955 to take a more active part in politics, apparently has no inclination to resume the throne and has also made public excuses for not

having any of his sons or his mother act in this capacity.

A public squabble over a successor and a prolonged interregnum could weaken the institution of the monarchy, which is important for national unity and as a bulwark against Communist ideology. There is also the danger that, to divert public attention from domestic problems, Sihanouk will deliberately enlarge Cambodia's present disputes with South Vietnam and Thailand. In this, he would undoubtedly find a sympathetic audience in Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai, who may visit Cambodia early next month.

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SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

21 April 1960

PART III**PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES****THE CHINESE COMMUNIST IMPACT ON EAST GERMANY**

The East German party leadership has shown considerable sympathy for some of the ideas, programs, and policies of the Chinese Communist party that are viewed either with reserve or disapproval by Moscow. Other satellite parties have also from time to time shown sympathy for one or more of these Chinese initiatives, but none has shown a greater overall affinity for Peiping.

confronted with many problems similar to those faced by the Chinese, share with Peiping certain attitudes regarding ideology and domestic as well as foreign policy.

The East German leadership has demonstrated in its public statements a much greater respect for Mao personally and for Mao's thought than have the Russians. While Khrushchev's birthday telegram to Mao in December 1958 emphasized Mao's "faithfulness" to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, Ulbricht's telegram congratulated Mao for

They (the Chinese and the Germans) are struggling jointly, determinedly, and successfully, the Chinese People's Republic in the Far East and the German Democratic Republic in the heart of Europe, for peace and for the upholding of the national interests of their peoples against the war policy of the militarists and imperialists.

There were and are many Chinese experiences which, supplementing the great experiences of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, are of general international applicability.

The people's communes will rank among the foremost of the most important achievements when the successes of the Chinese People's Republic are summed up on its tenth anniversary.

-- Paul Wandel, East German Ambassador to China, writing in Einheit, issue no. 10, 1959.

"valuably enriching" Marxism-Leninism and for "imparting to our party, too, invaluable knowledge for the cause of socialist construction."

During the tenth anniversary of the Chinese Communist regime in October 1959, Ulbricht went so far as to say that Khrushchev, in making his visit to the United States, had conducted himself there in consonance with a "Marxist finding" of Mao's on the eternally hostile nature of imperialism. This is the only known case in which a satellite spokesman has depicted a Soviet leader's action as a practical

More cultural, economic, and political delegations have gone to Peiping in recent years from East Germany than from any other European bloc country.

It is extreme to suggest, as some Western journalists have done, the existence of a "Peiping-Pankow axis" directed against Khrushchev. The realities of geography and East German political, economic, and military dependence on Moscow prohibit any such coalition against Khrushchev. Yet the East German (GDR) leaders,

SECRET

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

21 April 1960

You can say what you like, but we need ideals, and the only place you can get them today is from Mao Tse-tung...not from Khrushchev.... Mao isn't satisfied, as Khrushchev seems to be, with mere increases in tractor production and new steel mills. The Chinese attitude has more to do with human relations. --A young East German Communist, quoted by David Binder, Chicago Daily News, March 1959.

A government commission took me to the People's Republic of China, and I must say that I returned a changed man. These people are going forward with work at a rocket pace. The unity of will is so overwhelming that it borders almost on the miraculous. --An East German plant foreman who visited China in 1959, addressing a meeting in Bitterfeld, attended by Ulbricht.

execution of a doctrine formulated by Mao.

It is possible that Ulbricht was attempting to reconcile divergent Soviet and Chinese foreign policy views by implying that Khrushchev's detente tactics were only temporary and but one stage in what Mao depicts as the long-term "struggle" of the people against imperialism. Ulbricht could as easily, however, have quoted Lenin or Stalin on the long-term irreconcilability of the two camps. By quoting Mao on such a basic problem, Ulbricht not only left the impression that it was Mao who provided the best long-range ideological framework in which to view Khrushchev's current tactics, but he also suggested uneasiness about the detente tactics themselves.

While Moscow seems to have a low evaluation of the ideological aspects of the Chinese "general line of socialist construction," the East German party (SED) leaders seem to have genuine admiration for the way in which they believe the Chinese Communist party has engendered throughout its party and populace a dynamic socialist spirit which they themselves have been seeking to cultivate at home.

The East Germans believe there is much in the Chinese Communist program, Chinese methods of mass mobilization, and the Chinese manipulation of ideology that can be adapted to local use.

For such reasons, East German leaders and mass media have been considerably

more enthusiastic than has Moscow in praising the Chinese "leap forward" and the Chinese communes. They have referred to Chinese "miracles" of development, made invidious comparisons between Chinese and Soviet rates of development, cited Chinese rather than Soviet experience as a justification for speeding up the rate of advance in their own country, and suggested that the Chinese leap could be an "example" for other bloc countries.

East German leaders and media have consistently praised the communes, although always excluding their applicability to the GDR. There is a belief that much in the rationale and spirit behind the commune program can be applied in their own country. Unlike the Russians, they have described the communes as of great international importance, as an "enrichment" of Marxism-Leninism, as the "foremost" of many

Ulbricht firmly believes that there is much in the rationale behind the Chinese Communist program which can be adapted to East Germany's particular circumstances. -- A Neues Deutschland editor to a Western reporter, August 1959.

The "leap forward" in China far surpasses all previous ideas of the possibilities of a country's political, economic, scientific, and cultural development. In a way, this is even true with regard to comparisons within the socialist camp. All socialist countries have, of course, made "leaps." But the "great leap" of the Chinese People's Republic can be regarded as an example also for these (leaps in other socialist countries) and similar mass movements in the socialist countries. -- Die Nation, 1 October 1959.

China...in a few years time will have caught up with the most advanced countries economically and in the fields of education and science. -- Premier Grotewohl, 1 October 1959.

SECRET

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

21 April 1960

Chinese achievements, and specifically as an example for other Asian peoples. The GDR is as yet the only party in the bloc to comment favorably on China's new drive to extend the communes to the cities.

Several existing East German programs resemble Chinese practice and are said to have been inspired by Peiping. These include the requirement that army officers spend one month each year performing the duties of enlisted men or noncommissioned officers; the requirement that white-collar functionaries spend one month in industrial production; the drive to establish a close relationship between East German intellectuals and manual workers; and the development of such forms as "socialist work teams" and "socialist study groups" throughout East German society.

In foreign policy, the East German leaders share many of Peiping's reservations about Khrushchev's detente tactics. Both countries have at times stressed that their respective positions on the periphery of the bloc make vigilance against the West particularly important, thus insinuating that Russia's more remote position permits it the luxury of a relaxed international posture which China and East Germany cannot afford. Both countries have been generally more militant in their foreign policy propaganda than have the Russians, and each has often and promptly supported the more extreme views of the other.

China was the only bloc country to endorse fully and authoritatively Ulbricht's recent threat to ask the USSR for rocket weapons. A People's Daily editorial outdid Ulbricht and called the GDR request not only justified but "necessary." The minimal Soviet comment on the issue was confined to German-language broadcasts.

Peiping also, unlike Moscow, has given support to

East Germany's persistent demands to be represented at the forthcoming summit talks. The Russians, while they have privately pressed for German participation at the summit, have not made a public call for such representation, probably because they do not wish to jeopardize in advance the summit talks. For its part, East Germany supported Peiping for more than a month in the Sino-Indian border dispute, despite Moscow's avowed neutrality and despite Ulbricht's own long-standing interest in securing Indian recognition.

East Germany also took a position much closer to Peiping's than to Moscow's on the Algerian crisis; the GDR has at least on one occasion directly endorsed--as no other bloc country has done--Peiping's stand that it will not be bound by any international disarmament agreement reached without its formal participation; and the GDR has offered propaganda support for Peiping's "right" to Taiwan at times when Moscow was silent.

There are several indications that Peiping is actively encouraging the East Germans to oppose those aspects of Moscow's detente policy which it finds objectionable. In October 1959 the Chinese delegate to the East German trade union congress took a radically different line from that of the Soviet representative to the same congress. While the Soviet delegate stressed the need for peaceful coexistence, the Chinese delegate singled out the United States for attack, said East Germany was a strong point in the struggle against American and West German aggression, and urged a continuing "struggle" against imperialist aggression.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

21 April 1960

25X1

to questions of theory--in itself rare--lends credibility to the possibility that the conference was largely intended to reassert Soviet ideological primacy and, by implication, to undercut Mao's prestige.

In the final analysis, as long as Moscow and Peiping offer variant ideological approaches as well as variant foreign and domestic policies, the bloc leaders will follow those which most conform to their own vested interests. Peiping's militancy attracts many of the Eastern European leaders, such as Ulbricht, to whom the Polish and Yugoslav patterns of socialism, the de-Stalinization campaign, and the Soviet efforts at detente represent a far greater threat to the stability of their own regimes than to that of the USSR itself. Many of these satellite leaders, like the Chinese, have never been enthusiastic about Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign and fear that a relaxation of international tension and more permissive internal policies will inevitably lead to domestic pressures for further liberalization--ultimately posing a threat to the regime.

Despite Chinese efforts to encourage East German militancy, and despite the demonstrated affinity between East German and Chinese foreign policy views, East German propaganda has since late November generally been in agreement with Khrushchev's contention that the West sincerely wants a relaxation of tension. This would seem to suggest that Ulbricht has drawn in his horns, possibly as a direct result of increased Soviet pressure.

There have been several indications recently that Moscow is moving to head off Chinese ideological influence in Eastern Europe in general and East Germany in particular. As one example, at an SED central committee theoretical conference on 30 January, Soviet presidium member O. V. Kuusinen failed to include the Chinese "great leap" among the five "gigantic leaps" during the 20th century. He made numerous references to the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, but none to those of Mao. The unusual appearance of such a high-ranking Soviet figure at a satellite central committee conference addressed exclusively

The more Stalinist satellite leaders such as Ulbricht will thus seek to play off the Chinese against the Russians in the hope of exercising greater leverage on Khrushchev's policies and use Chinese views to argue against domestic party opponents, who prefer relatively moderate policies and programs. Moreover, as Communist China increasingly becomes the bloc's principal advocate of a more militant foreign policy and a more "fundamentalist" and coercive domestic policy, it may expand its influence with like-minded satellite leaders and thus be a cause of continuing concern for Moscow.

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
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21 Apr 11 1960

Hostile reaction throughout the British Commonwealth to South African racial practices is placing unusual strain on Commonwealth relationships on the eve of the prime ministers' meetings from 3 to 11 May, the first in nearly three years. Commonwealth ties, both material and symbolic, have been gradually loosening, but all members still find the association useful, and London is seeking to

monwealth naval exercise in the Indian Ocean provides a link, as does attendance at the Imperial Defense College by senior military and civilian officers at Britain's expense. As a special case, Malaya has relied heavily on Commonwealth military aid for operations against Communist terrorists. Some 19,300 Commonwealth troops now are stationed there.



Material Considerations

The economic importance of the Commonwealth affiliation has declined with the general expansion of world trade. Although Britain remains the principal export market of most members, their trade is being gradually oriented toward the United States and Continental Europe.

In early March an official
of the Commonwealth Relations

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

21 April 1960


Office (CRO) acknowledged that the advantages of Commonwealth preferences are declining. The preference system--a series of bilateral agreements between members or colonies which flourished in the restrictive trading years of the 1930s--is being continually eroded by shifting trade patterns and rising price levels. Nevertheless, it is still highly regarded by many interests; India, for example, attaches great importance to preferences accorded its textiles in the United Kingdom.

Britain's efforts to avoid exclusion from Western European markets give it reason of its

areas is also overshadowed by those of other countries. In the year ending on 31 March, British bilateral aid--nearly 90 percent of it to the colonies and the Commonwealth--totaled \$320,000,000 in contrast with US appropriations in fiscal 1960 of \$976,000,000 (Development Loan Fund, technical cooperation, special aid). New Delhi welcomed the \$141,000,000 in loans London provided over the past two years, but found the Soviet Union agreeing to provide nearly three times that amount in support of India's Third Five-Year Plan. The only other major contributor to the intra-Commonwealth aid program is Canada, with just under \$60,000,000 annually.

**TOTAL DISTRIBUTION OF UNITED KINGDOM'S
BILATERAL ASSISTANCE**

(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

**Expanding Membership**

The British often assert that the Commonwealth's strength lies in its heterogeneity. London is therefore not troubled by the fact that in the next five years the Commonwealth will become predominantly Asian-African in composition when as many as eight or nine new members join. With the possible exception of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, all will be ruled by non-Europeans.

own to reassess Commonwealth economic bonds at this time. To achieve agreement on the seven-nation European Free Trade Association, London had to accord some agricultural concessions to non-Commonwealth countries. Pressure is growing for ties with the European Economic Community (EEC), in view of the prospect that some German and Benelux tariffs on British goods will rise on 1 July if the first step toward the EEC's common external tariff is taken then as planned.

Britain's economic assistance program to underdeveloped

In recent months, nevertheless, some official doubts have been expressed that future additions may detract from the relationship. This is partly a matter of sheer numbers--the fear that the presence of so many representatives at Commonwealth meetings may inhibit the traditional intimacy of discussions. London has given some thought to keeping the number down by trying to satisfy smaller territories with a status falling short of complete

SECRET

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

21 April 1960

independence, such as now obtains in Singapore. The difficulty of this approach in the face of demands by local politicians for complete equality is shown, however, by Britain's recent agreement in principle to accord eventual independence to British Guiana.

Cyprus presents a unique problem for the Commonwealth relationship. The United Kingdom has not yet committed itself to full membership for the island, and plans to submit the question to the meetings next month. The island's special treaty ties with Greece and Turkey on becoming independent provide grounds for objections, and a CRO official has already expressed doubts that "other members" would admit Archbishop Makarios to the prime ministers' conference on a basis of equality with Nehru and Macmillan.

Meanwhile, the movement toward republicanism and away from the symbolic link to Britain through the crown is accelerating. Ghana is in the process of becoming a republic, and Ceylon and South Africa are planning the same step. While India and Pakistan have demonstrated that becoming a republic involves no loss of Commonwealth standing, in the case of South Africa and Ghana this could be the first step toward eventual departure from the Commonwealth.

The South African Issue

The problem of relations with the Union of South Africa intensifies the strains inherent in the Commonwealth relationship. The manner in which the crisis is handled at the prime ministers' conference will show whether the Commonwealth retains its ability to withstand tensions between individual members.

Hostile reaction throughout the Commonwealth to the Verwoerd government's handling of racial disturbances will compel the informal airing of the issue while the heads of governments are present in London, but outside regular meetings.

The growing feeling that South Africa is a liability to the association may profoundly affect consideration of projected changes to republican status, normally a routine procedure. If any prime minister wished to force Pretoria to leave the Commonwealth, he could object to allowing South Africa to retain membership as a republic. If, on the other hand, the Verwoerd government becomes so disturbed at "interference" in its internal policies that it seeks an excuse for withdrawing, it could object to Ghana's becoming a republic, anticipating that other members would rather ease out South Africa than Ghana.

Outlook

Despite all the divisive factors, Britain and most other members apparently believe the Commonwealth can continue to play a useful role. Macmillan has recognized the growing importance of personal ties to offset the republican trend, and in his three years as prime minister has visited all member countries except Malaya. Ghana, although a republic, would still recognize Queen Elizabeth as head of the Commonwealth and would receive her as such early next year.

More important is London's intention to add to the attractiveness of Commonwealth membership by favoring independent underdeveloped members with substantial economic aid, even at the price of some domestic tax increases. Since the Commonwealth

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

21 April 1960

economic conference in September 1958, British bilateral aid to independent members, mainly in the form of loans, has jumped more than fivefold, to \$114,000,000 in the year that ended on 31 March. As more colonies attain independence, London may be expected to allot to the Commonwealth a substantial share of the estimated \$175,000,000 in economic aid, mainly grants, it supplied the colonies in the past year.

For other members, the intangible reasons for continuing association seem likely to survive. Nehru sees the Commonwealth as a mutually beneficial association independent of the cold war; Nkrumah, as a forum for gaining sympathy and understanding for Africa; Ayub, as

a factor for strengthening British political as well as economic interest in Pakistan's problems. Devices to demonstrate the supposed equality of all members may increase; for example, more Commonwealth meetings may be held outside the United Kingdom.

While withdrawals may occur under the impact of nationalist pressures, the Commonwealth appears prepared to ride out the present storm over the South African racial troubles unless they increase substantially. At next month's meetings, Nehru, as senior statesman present, is likely to set the tone for the other Asians and Africans by arguing the continuing need to keep open channels of Commonwealth communication.

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POLITICAL RUMBLINGS IN FRANCE

When the French parliament reconvenes on 26 April, Premier Debré will probably be able to defeat the threatened censure motion planned by deputies disgruntled over President de Gaulle's refusal to recall the assembly ahead of schedule. Nevertheless, De Gaulle's intimation that he sees no early end to the Algerian war was a turning point for important elements of his political support previously willing to swallow their misgivings about other policies in the hope of an early Algerian settlement. Increasing criticism of De Gaulle can be expected, particularly regarding the way he has reduced the role of parliament and the cabinet under his new constitution.

Honeymoon Over

De Gaulle's personal prestige is still high in France, but a switch in informed public opinion became apparent in early March following his trip to army posts in Algeria. The contrast between his call to the army for a renewed "pacification" drive and his optimism of the previous week on ceasefire possibilities aroused consternation in liberal circles in France. Almost immediately thereafter he stirred up wide press and parliamentary criticism by rejecting, with doubtful legality, a petition of a majority of deputies for an emergency parliamentary session on the farm problem.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**



21 April 1960

When the National Assembly voted the government special powers in early February following the Algiers insurrection, the deputies were reaffirming the faith expressed in June 1958 by the chastened Fourth Republic assembly which hoped he would settle the Algerian question. He had then wanted two years of full power to restore order. The suspicion that he no longer seems

ria, other politicians are eager to attack him on issues they have heretofore subordinated to the overriding Algerian question. The agricultural crisis is ready-made for most of De Gaulle's opponents in the assembly, and the alacrity with which they seized on it is as much a gauge of their opposition to government policies as of their frustration over the reduced importance of the assembly under the Fifth Republic.

THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT

DEBRÉ COALITION

New Political Atmosphere

De Gaulle's flat refusal to call an early session of parliament has sparked a move for a motion of censure against the government when the regular session opens. It seems unlikely that all the deputies who sought the special session are prepared to vote against Debré and accept the consequences--dissolution of the assembly. Nevertheless, a showdown is brought closer by the decline in the government's prestige. All parties except the Union for a New Republic (UNR), which rode into office on De Gaulle's prestige, seem in-

confident of an early end to hostilities has removed the major reason for parliamentary docility. Socialist leader Guy Mollet clearly delineated the changed atmosphere in an open letter in mid-March criticizing practically every aspect of De Gaulle's foreign and domestic policies.

While Mollet personally believes that De Gaulle must still be backed as France's only hope for peace in Alge-

creasingly inclined to feel they could better their position in a new assembly--the Independents because of discontent with the Algerian self-determination offer and agricultural policy, and the parties on the left because of social discontent.

The new element underlying the deputies' willingness to attack the government is the note of skepticism now apparent in press analyses of De Gaulle's

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

21 April 1960

program. For example, Maurice Duverger, a prominent constitutional authority and political commentator, sees a growing general suspicion that there is nothing behind the President's oratory but the political void of the preceding regime. Duverger feels that although the nation does not yet believe it has deceived itself in placing full confidence in De Gaulle, it is beginning to admit such a possibility.

Extraparliamentary Opposition

Even though immediate dissolution of the assembly is unlikely, few deputies expect it to serve out its five-year term, and many unsuccessful 1958 aspirants are eager to replace them. On 3 April the United Socialist party was formed by three left-wing splinter groups, agreed only in their opposition to De Gaulle and in a recognition that disunity is a fatal political vice.

A more immediate and more serious threat to political stability may develop from the Information Center on Algerian and Saharan Problems, which former Deputy Premier Jacques Soustelle has just formed in Paris. Soustelle has begun to broaden his criticism of the regime and seems heading for outright opposition. He no longer commands the strong position he had in right-wing circles immediately after the May 1958 coup, but an anti-Gaullist stance would rally to him many disgruntled civilian and military proponents of the coup.

Assuming Debré can convince the rural populace that the government's program of technical advances and agricultural reorganization offers more advantages in the long run than do the price supports their leaders now are seeking, the major domestic threat in the near future may come from la-

bor restiveness. Discontent is rising among public employees, whose Socialist-oriented union will press hard for wage concessions in the 1961 budget.

While labor pressure has been blunted by recent wage concessions, there is some ground for concern over the possibility of joint action by the Communist-led and non-Communist labor confederations. The one-hour strike of Communist and Catholic confederations on 1 February, in support of the government's firmness against the Algiers insurrection, may have had a lasting psychological impact.

The government may seek to dam other potential sources of discord by accommodation or foresighted action. It has already relented in its attack on veterans' pensions, an issue which generated antigovernment wrath in 1959. The extensive reassignment of military leaders identified to any degree with antiregime activities is an obvious precautionary measure. In view of the petition anticlerical forces are circulating for abrogation of the expanded aid to church schools voted in December, Debré may apply the law with extreme caution. In any event, the government will probably be increasingly cautious to avoid antagonizing several influential groups at the same time.

Constitutional Revision

Parliamentary and extraparliamentary opposition will converge on constitutional reform. This issue is potentially the most damaging De Gaulle must contend with, because his pragmatic approach to specific problems has left him open to the charge that he has ignored the instrument which identifies him with the Fifth Republic. This spring, parliament will revise the articles to legalize

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

21 April 1960

the independent status which is already being accorded most of the states of the French Community. Criticism of the discrepancies due to the rapid evolution of the Community has been on the whole sympathetic, and no serious contest is anticipated on the changes required.

The major criticism of constitutional developments under De Gaulle hits at the progressive abandonment of the concept of the president as an arbiter between the cabinet and parliament. De Gaulle clearly usurped the cabinet's prerogative, as defined in Article 20, to "determine and direct the policy of the nation" when he made his 16 September proposal for an Algerian settlement. His refusal to convene the assembly at the behest of a majority of the deputies may be more defensible on the basis of the constitutional text, but legal experts charge that his interpretation violates the spirit of the law.

This stand has unleashed bitter demands for a basic reappraisal of France's political framework. Critics decry the progressive debility of parliament and the disappearance of cabinet initiative and responsibility. They argue that the cabinet has been reduced to a consultative council of technicians who carry out decisions reached at restricted committee meetings presided over by De Gaulle.

Assembly demands for a basic reform of the constitution would probably meet strong resistance from De Gaulle. One observer suggests he may react to parliamentary pressure by abusing the referendum provision, "a practice leading only to dictatorship."

Viability of Fifth Republic

The constitution provides for removal of the president for incapacity, but few Frenchmen foresee this contingency for De Gaulle. They have confidence in his commitment to democracy, although they are somewhat concerned over what might follow him.

There are some indications that De Gaulle's personal capacities are proving inadequate for the presidential role his constitution envisaged. He is now 69, and the death of his younger brother in late 1959 seems to have brought home sharply to him that his mother was his only close relative to have lived beyond his present age. Time is an important factor for him as he approaches the end of the two-year period he had originally considered sufficient to bring order to the country. He will probably be increasingly tempted to seek authoritarian shortcuts to block what he considers nostalgic attempts by politicians to return to "the delights of the system" he felt confident he had replaced.

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SOUTH KOREA'S ARMED FORCES

South Korea's armed forces continued to improve during 1959 and achieved a fairly high degree of initial combat readiness, but they are not capable of sustained combat. Improvement can be expected to continue, but at a slower pace, as present plans for reorganization

near completion. The army demonstrated ruggedness and determination to fight during the Korean war, but many men with combat experience have been discharged. Morale and leadership, which are believed to be good, will be increasingly difficult to maintain.

SECRET

SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

21 April 1960

Capabilities

The South Korean armed forces constitute the largest anti-Communist military force in Asia. They are capable of maintaining internal security, defending South Korea's boundaries against minor incursions, and conducting a successful defense against a North Korean attack

SOUTH KOREAN ARMED FORCES**ARMY**

543,000 MEN
2 ARMIES
5 Corps
18 Divisions
10 Reserve Divisions

NAVY

14,500 MEN AND
24,000 MARINES (1 Division)
19 Patrol Vessels
8 Mine Vessels
24 Amphibious Vessels
11 Auxiliary Vessels

AIR FORCE

21,200 MEN
258 AIRCRAFT
138 F-86F Jet Fighters
10 RF-86F Reconnaissance
18 C-46 Piston Transports
28 T-33 Jet Trainers
74 Other Aircraft

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21 APRIL 1960

for a short time. If Communist China joined an assault, however, American air, naval, and logistical support would be needed immediately.

The armed forces are under the operational control of the commander of the United Nations forces--the commander of the US Eighth Army--and are believed

unlikely to begin a large-scale action without informing their American counterparts. Recent threats by President Syngman Rhee to launch a "march north" for the unification of Korea were probably designed to counteract the effect of the regime's tactics in the presidential elections of 15 March and were recognized as such by most South Korean military leaders.

The armed forces are not capable of offensive action on a scale adequate to defeat Communist forces in North Korea and unify the country. Ammunition and gasoline stocks are limited, and the South Korean forces are dependent on the United States for additional supplies. Despite these weaknesses, the South Koreans at any time could provoke an incident designed to reopen hostilities.

Army

The South Korean Army consists of 18 infantry divisions, an antiaircraft artillery brigade, 5 antiaircraft artillery battalions, 10 tank battalions, 15 field artillery battalions, and 5 heavy-mortar battalions. Unit organization is similar to that of the US Army, and the Korean Army follows American tactical doctrines. Ten of the infantry divisions are deployed along the southern boundary of the Demilitarized Zone; the remaining eight divisions are held as corps and army reserves.

An active reserve program maintains an additional ten divisions at cadre strength, but rapid mobilization would be hampered by the lack of major items of equipment other than small arms and certain types of infantry weapons.

In an effort to modernize the army, the infantry divisions are being reorganized to give

SECRET

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

21 April 1960

better balance between infantry and artillery, to increase firepower, and to improve capability for sustained combat. Three 105-mm. howitzer battalions are authorized for each division, and the number of weapons per battalion is being increased from 12 to 18. A battalion of 155-mm. howitzers will be available to reinforce divisional artillery and provide a counter-battery capability. A newly organized 106-mm. recoilless rifle company will provide antitank defense.

Combat effectiveness of the army is hampered by corruption, inexperience in logistical operations, the loss of trained personnel, and the deterioration and obsolescence of artillery and armored equipment. Deficiencies in motor transportation and communications equipment are being remedied under US aid programs.

Factionalism and rivalries have precipitated sweeping re-assignments of high-ranking officers. Although morale among enlisted men is generally good, pockets of discontent have appeared occasionally. The armed forces may be affected by the growing civil disaffection resulting from brutal police suppression of election-day demonstrations.

The minister of national defense recently showed grave concern over the problem of maintaining the morale of a large inactive force and told American officials that he believed the army faces gradual deterioration and stagnation unless put to some military use. In an effort to improve morale, the government has introduced a military pay raise, implemented a plan to pension retired personnel, and authorized local procurement of perishable food by individual units.

Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Song Yo-chan, apparently with the support of the minister of national defense and President Rhee, is vigorously implementing a campaign to clean out corruption. During the past year more than 1,400 officers, including seven generals, were released for incompetence. Lt. Gen. Yang Kuk-chin, former commander of the III Corps, was arrested on 9 April on the grounds that he had stolen gasoline. Other high-ranking officers are implicated. To improve the army logistical system, General Song has reduced diversion of military supplies, improved training of personnel in logistical jobs, and raised maintenance standards. A joint armed forces committee on construction is being formed to centralize control of construction funds, materials, and labor.

Navy

The navy has two destroyer escorts, four patrol escorts, four escorts, and numerous smaller ships and amphibious craft, all obtained from the US. The navy is organized into task forces which patrol the waters contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone to prevent infiltration of Communist agents and seizure of South Korean fishermen by North Korean patrols.

The navy is capable of defending itself against a weak force such as the North Korean Navy, but it is incapable of conducting effective operations against the stronger Chinese Communist naval forces. Anti-submarine, minesweeping, and escort capabilities are limited by obsolescent equipment. Fire support is limited to three-inch guns on patrol vessels, and no vessel has fire-control equipment adequate for accurate antiaircraft fire against jet aircraft.

SECRET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

21 April 1960

The marine corps, consisting of one division, can operate effectively as part of a larger ground force and has the capability of conducting amphibious operations involving a regimental landing team. During a recent amphibious exercise, the navy and marine corps displayed a good capability for planning and executing operations of regimental strength against light to moderate resistance, but serious deficiencies in logistical planning were also revealed. In addition, over-all operational effectiveness is lowered by obsolete vessels and the complete lack of an air arm to support naval action.

Air Force

The air force consists of five F-86F fighter-bomber squadrons, one RF-86F reconnaissance squadron, one C-46 transport squadron, and one tactical air controller squadron. All air force units except the tactical air controller squadron are combat ready, and the rate of aircraft in commission is over 70 percent. The air force can fly close-support and interdiction missions and is qualified to supplement US units.

The 138 jet fighters of the South Korean Air Force, if not destroyed on the ground in the first hours of combat by the 600-odd jet fighters and 100-odd jet bombers based in North Korea, could be expected to exist as an effective force in only the initial phases of fighting. Fuel supplies for many units are available for only seven days. The air force lacks an all-weather capability. For defense against night attack, it must rely on

army-controlled 90- and 40-mm. antiaircraft guns, which are ineffective against jets. Lack of air force - navy coordination hampers air-supported amphibious operations.

Political Influence

Most top military leaders are believed to be personally loyal to President Rhee and have consistently delivered the military vote to the administration at election time. Rhee has prevented any possibility that the military might develop an effective independent influence in politics by his policy of playing off military leaders against each other and of retiring or transferring generals from command positions before they become entrenched. He has appointed some to civilian and diplomatic positions.

While all ranks are seemingly loyal to the republic and strongly anti-Communist, there are indications that many junior officers and enlisted men are personally opposed to the ruling Liberal party. This opposition, however, has failed to find an effective outlet.

The armed forces will probably favor a constitutional succession when Rhee dies. Should the succession be accompanied by serious popular unrest beyond the control of the civil authorities, the military probably would intervene to maintain order. In the event of a complete breakdown of civil authority, the military might take over the government until it could be returned to a civil administration. In any event, top military leaders very likely would be receptive to American influence.

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